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Abstract. Securing telemedicine services is essentially a critical and urgent topic. 
However, in many existing telemedicine systems security related issues are seldom 
seriously considered. In this paper, we introduce an image-based simulated system for 
kyphoplasty telesurgery, wherein special attentions are drawn to address the security 
problems. Among others, various security requirements of the system are formalised, 
and solutions to meet these requirements are presented.  Consequently, we implement 
the system to work in a secure way. In fact, our methods can be applied to a class of 
similar telemedicine services. To implement this system, we take efficiency as our 
premier consideration.  
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1 Introduction 
 
Accelerated by the advances of information technology as well as the wide deployment of high-
speed computer networks especially Internet, telemedicine services have gained great progress in 
recent years. Telemedicine refers to the provision of clinical care, education and many other 
clinically significant value-added services over a distance, using advanced telecommunication 
infrastructures. Its main goal is set to share valuable expertise and resources to a wider extent by 
providing different levels of support for remote monitoring, diagnostic and therapeutic medical 
procedures. The environment in which telemedicine services can be provided is summarized in 
[1] as a tri-layered structure, named from top to bottom as services layer, application layer and 
infrastructure layer. These layers well define the constituting elements of telemedicine: medical 
applications (procedures), information technology such as image processing, audio, video, 
database, etc., underlying hardware infrastructures including computer networks and service-
specific appliances. Clinical applications of telemedicine are now found in virtually every 
specialty, among which telediagnosis, telemonitoring, teleconsultation, telemanagement, tele-
education [2] are an assortment of typical telematic services. Telemedicine reflects the 
convergence of technological advances in a number of fields, including medical procedures and 
medicine. 
 
Just like e-commerce, etc., telemedicine is a product and then a valuable tool of information 
society. We are more or less familiar with the traditional health care paradigm: a patient must first 
go to the hospital and the treatment can only recur to the doctors and experts within that hospital, 
and if needed the patient will be kept hospitalized. We note that actually not all cases are serious 
enough to undergo the same stubborn routines. Therefore, such kind of working style is destined 
to be costly, in terms of both money and time. More importantly, with it there are not convenient 
ways to share expertise and resources to a wider extent. To see this, suppose a scenario that 
  
doctors in the local hospital are unable to tackle a case of a particular patient, they need to seek 
help from an abroad hospital. Most possibly, an expert has to travel a long way to help while the 
ultimate help proves to be just an analysis of certain MRIs of the patient. Telemedicine changes 
such embarrassing circumstances significantly. In this case, the abroad expert can stay home to 
examine the patient’s MRIs delivered through telemedicine services, avoiding long way journey, 
and responds accordingly also through telemedicine services. It is evident that compared with 
conventional health care protocols, telemedicine works in a more cost-effective and timely 
fashion. Telemedicine extends existing health care system and revolutionizes traditional working 
paradigms, benefiting both medical community and patients. Take chronic wounds healing in [3] 
as an example: according to the authors, in U.S. approximately 5 million patients generate annual 
costs for chronic wound care in excess of $20 billion in 1996, growing 10% annually. They 
estimated that by using the home-oriented tele-WMS (wound management system), there can be 
totoally $5.7 billion or an estimated cost of $37,825/client savings, coming primarily from (1) 
cost savings for hospitals by shifting patients to the home care environment and thus increasing 
patient population by sharing resources such as doctors, nurses and medical facilities. (2) Less 
expense of patients for shortened lengths of hospitalisation and less emotional costs at home-
setting. They thus conclude that chronic wound care through telemedicine promises to be 
competitive in the managed care environment and will provide organizational, technological, and 
financial incentives. In summary, potential benefits of telemedicine services include improved 
access to diagnostic facilities, reduced costs (less travel and work-leave expenditure, etc.), 
reduced isolation for both patients and medical personnel, improved quality of health care 
through real-time diagnosis, increased collaboration and continuous education, and direct access 
to remote computational facilities for advanced image processing and 3D visualization [1, 4, 5]. 
Therefore, despite it is far from maturity as there are a multitude of regulatory, legal, ethical 
issues and technical impediments it has to wrestle with [6], telemedicine is substantially expected 
to be valuable and indispensable assistance to the medical community.  
 
Telemedicine by definition are services involving exchange of text files, medical diagnostic 
imaging modalities, audio, video-clips over computer networks (even Internet) to a regional, 
national, or global scale, so it faces the same security challenges during information transmission 
as the interbank electronic transfer of funds. In fact, data security and information privacy is not a 
new issue in health care community. For example, There have been a great number of standards, 
models, policies and proposals to regulate the management of personal patient data and 
information (among others, for example [7-16]). However, they are more on the protection of 
confidentiality and integrity of stored clinical data (records) or information flow in the context of 
clinical information system than safeguarding the delivery of clinical data in multimedia form or 
the communication itself as needed in telemedicine. Medical data and services are essentially 
security and integrity sensitive, which determines security considerations are inevitable in 
telemedcine or in other forms of comprehensive communication and co-operative environment 
for health care. With the advent of substantial development in telemedcine, more and more 
attentions are drawn to those issues such as privacy, security, integrity, authentication, access 
control and etc., in both communication and applications. Health care Informatics Standards 
Board (ANSI HISM), American Health Information Management Association (AHIMA), 
American Medical Association (AMA), European Standardization of Health Informatics Enabling 
Health Care Communication and many other organisations around the world are dedicated to 
standards establishment and management for health informatics security, focusing on those 
adaptable to the Internet era. In the meantime, a large amount of literature begins to discuss 
securing health care services, applications and systems over Internet [1, 17-22]. Security is 
growing into a hot topic in the field of telemedicine. 
 
  
Contrast to the high academic research enthusiasm for security, it seems the developers of 
telemedicine applications and systems are sluggish to follow suit. There have many telemedicine 
systems been developed [3, 23-28], wherein security issues were rarely considered, so as to even 
some systems that began to touch such issues merely restricted themselves to some simple forms 
of protection such as password protection. For example, once a user inputs correct passwords to 
use the system in [28], he can use it without any further restriction. These systems impliedly 
assume that the information transmission channels are safe, which we know it is not the case in 
practice. We owe this situation mainly to the following reasons. First, most of the developers’ 
efforts were gone into solving service-specific technical problems of these systems. Whatever 
types of these systems, they each face technical difficulties and immaturity in their fields. Take 
teleradiology, the most common application among telemedicine for instance, advanced 
techniques for data fusion, synthetic imaging, visualisation, efficient and intelligent management 
of huge volume of multimedia patient data will remain a challenge [1]. Second, security 
implementation will inevitably impose additional cost as well efficiency penalty. Efficiency of 
the hardware infrastructure such as medical workstations, transmission networks has long been 
the endeavouring direction. Third, problems within the field of cryptography and security 
themselves prevent effective security implementation. For example, establishment of PKI, 
involvement of Trust Third Parties (TTPs) in some cryptographic protocols are practically hard. 
Despite these challenges, as technology advances we optimistically believe that security 
implementation will eventually be an integrant part of the telemedicine engineering in the near 
future, gaining the same importance as in electronic banking transactions and in e-commerce. 
 
In this paper, we present an image-based simulated system for kyphoplasty surgery, categorised 
into telesurgery, an important kind of telemedicine service. What differentiate ours from other 
literature describing telesurgery systems in that we instead concentrate dominantly to solve the 
security issues involved in this system.  In what follows, we describe the system framework from 
functionality perspective in section 2. Section 3 gives methods and implementation of the system, 
with special attentions given to security related issues. Finally, conclusion is drawn in section 4. 
 
2 Functional Framework 
 
We observe that a surgery is normally conducted by a group of co-operative surgeons, each, with 
necessary expertise for a particular part, in turn performing a step. Therefore, for simulation 
purpose, a real-world surgery process can be modelled as a series of sequential steps, each 
completed by one of the several participating surgeons who are in collaboration to perform the 
surgery. Motivated by this, our image-based telesurgery system simulates the sequential steps 
involved in a typical kyphoplasty surgery, allowing several surgeons in turn to complete his work. 
To this end, a surgery room originating, managing and monitoring the simulated surgery process 
and several remote participants constitute our system.  
 
A kyphoplasty surgery is literally a minimally invasive surgical procedure for treating 
osteoporotic fractures, aiming to stabilise the bone, and to restore some or all of the lost vertebral 
body height due to the compression fracture. Three sequential steps constitute the whole surgery 
process. 
 
¨ Step 1: A small incision is made in the back through which a surgeon places a narrow tube. 
Using fluoroscopy to guide it to the correct position, the tube creates a path through the back 
into the fractured area through the pedicle of the involved vertebrae. 
  
¨ Step 2: Using X-ray images, a surgeon inserts a special balloon through the tube and into the 
vertebrae, then gently and carefully inflates it. As the balloon inflates, it elevates the fracture, 
returning the pieces to a more normal position. It also compacts the soft inner bone to create a 
cavity inside the vertebrae. 
¨ Step 3: The balloon is removed and a surgeon uses specially designed instruments under low 
pressure to fill the cavity with a cement-like material called polymethylmethacrylate 
(PMMA). After being injected, the pasty material hardens quickly, stabilising the bone. 
 
Based on this, our system provides a simulated environment for three participants (front-end 
terminals together with participating surgeons), apart from the surgery room, to complete the 3-
step procedure, each responsible for a step. Within the context of the simulated system, we 
obscure the difference between a participant and a surgeon. The participants conceptually locate 
separately as the system is intended for telesurgery purpose. The reason justifying our design of 
multi-participants involvement is that we conjecture our system as a generalised framework of a 
class of similar telesurgery services. In this sense, this system can be quite easily adapted to the 
case of “surgery room-to-one participant”. Moreover, we presume that the participant of each step 
is only experienced in that particular step. In fact, it is relatively hard to find someone who is 
good at everything. So our design is especially conducive for those managing the surgery room to 
collect expertise from different participants. This is exactly a key goal of the system. Central to 
our system are: (a) the three steps must be completed in sequence, i.e., only after step 1 is finished 
can step 2 begins and step 3 does not proceed until step 2 ends. (b) Each participant is strictly 
restricted to complete the functionality of his step only. This restriction aims to avoid random 
operations by the participants as we assume a participant is only expertised in his step.  Suppose 
the three participants are Surgeon A (to perform step 1), Surgeon B (to perform step 2) and 
Surgeon C (to perform step 3), respectively, the functional framework of the system is sketched 
in Fig. 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this simulated environment, three participants, presumably Surgeon A, B, C are performing a 
“kyphoplasty surgery” originated by Surgery room. It works as follows. Surgery room 
Surgery Room 
Surgeon A 
Underlying Networks 
Surgeon B Surgeon C 
Fig. 1 System Functional Framework 
  
simultaneously distributes patient data (3D images) to the participating surgeons. Real-word 
operations on the patient by the surgeons are simulated by means of their modifications to the 
patient data (images). Each image is segmented (preferably by pre-processing) by automatic 
segmentation [29-31] or simply manual segmentation methods into parts so that each surgeon is 
restrained his privilege (modifications) to his own part. A surgeon cannot modify outside his part. 
Simulated surgery procedures are done in a sequential manner. Surgeon A takes the first turn to 
modify the image, completing above step 1. Afterwards Surgeon B continues to complete step 2 
upon verifying that prior modifications are indeed made by Surgeon A and within the allowed 
range. Surgeon C takes step 3 following the work by B in a similar way. In the end, Surgery 
Room gets a complete simulated process for a kyphoplasty surgery after three participants 
finishing their steps respectively.  
  
Our simulated system has many applications. It serves the following purposes.  
¨ Training and education. With the development of information technology in both hardware 
and software, especially multimedia processing techniques, training using simulation systems 
for students, practitioners, and medical staffs more and more becomes a common practice.  
Obviously our system can provide a simulated environment for kyphoplasty surgery for the 
purpose of training and educaiton.  
¨ Pre-surgery practice and planing. Prior to a real surgery, doctors or surgeons can learn to 
work in co-operation, can practise to plan the real surgery process, can gain enough 
proficiency and confidence, by using our system as a practising platform. Moreover, the 
doctors managing Surgeon Room are able to share expertise and experiences through the 
system from remote experts.  
¨ On-line assistance to a real-world surgery. Imagine this scenario: a real surgery is going on, 
paralleled by our simulated system.  Real-time patient data are continuing to be delivered 
over the system to remote experts who are joining in the system as participants. In this way, 
doctors in the real surgery are easy to get hints and guidance from the remote experts, which 
are especially useful when they are got trapped into dilemma.  
 
3 Methods and Implementation 
Security is a critical issue in our system. For example, suppose doctors, to plan a surgery process, 
use the system to accumulate knowledge from other experts. If the patient data transferred over 
the network were changed by malicious accesses, then the doctors would definitely be misguided 
and disastrous sequences are highly possible. For another use of our system, namely real-time 
assistance to an ongoing surgery process, security implementation is obviously in a more urgent 
demand.  
3.1 Security Requirements 
Key issues in the design and development of a telemedicine system include information integrity 
during transmission, authentication of submitted images and related data, and protection from 
unauthorised access [2]. In particular, we formalise security requirements for our systems in the 
following ways.  
 
q R1: Encryption 
Information flow between Surgery Room and participants, participants and participants must be 
encrypted to avoid inappropriate disclosure of patient data and to protect privacy and 
confidentiality of communication content.    
 
q R2: Integrity 
  
Measures must be taken to ensure that data travel safely against active and passive attacks during 
transmission, without being altered and compromised. 
 
q R3: Identification and Authentication 
Provision must be provided to ensure authenticity of all involving parties. In particular, all 
participants can verify the images (patient data) distributed to them are indeed from Surgery 
Room; Surgery Room and other participants must be guaranteed that modifications to the images 
(patient data) are done by the desired person as described later.    
 
q R4: Sequential Operations 
Recall that a central point of our system is that operations are done in a sequential manner. Thus 
ways must be supplied to guarantee every participant takes his turn to complete the functionality 
of his step.  
 
q R5: Access Control 
Another uniqueness of our system is that we restrict each participant to operate only in his part. In 
other words, a participant can only modify the patient data within the part to which he has been 
assigned privilege. Modifications outside his range are presumed to be illegitimate accesses. 
 
 
3.2 Implementation 
In this section, we present detailed implementation of the system, fulfilling above security 
requirements. Note that efficiency is a major concern to implement this system. In what follows, 
we will first in turn examine our considerations and solutions to the system security requirements 
listed above.  
 
Solution to R1 (S1): We choose a symmetric cipher rather than a public-key cipher to protect 
data and information privacy in our system for the former transcends the latter in terms of 
efficiency. We refer to encryption algorithm and decryption algorithm of the symmetric cipher as 
EK(.) and DK(.) respectively, and the secret key as K. All communications over the system are 
protected under this symmetric cipher. K, essentially a session key, does not keep fix, whereas 
varies from session to session. A session starts with Surgery Room beginning to dispatch an 
image to the participants and ends with every participant finishing his operations. Normally 
Surgery Room determines K and distributes it to the participants via a secure channel. Key 
distribution is a problem as we assume communication channels of the system are insecure. As 
we will see later, secure channels can be established by the public-key cryptosystem employed 
for authentication. 
  
Solution to R2 (S2): Normally, one-way hash functions are used to guarantee integrity of the data 
being transferred in such a way that hash value of the message is appended to the original 
message and they are transferred together. Upon checking, the receiver computes the hash value 
using the message and then compares it with the appended hash value, if the two are same, then 
the message is safely transferred. A characteristic of hash functions makes them extremely 
suitable to ensure data integrity, that is even one bit of input alteration will result in drastic 
changes in their outputs. However, in our system exactly this property hinders standard hash 
functions such as MD5 and SHA directly applied. For one thing, we know our system involves 
transmission of medical images over long-range telecommunication networks, thus transmission 
error is inevitable despite error detection mechanisms provided by the various levels of the 
network architecture [32]. For the other, these medical images possibly undergo various non-
  
malicious manipulations such as enhancement, format changes, etc., so small changes are 
assumed to be acceptable. With these, it makes sense to allow our system for insignificant 
changes to uncritical parts of the images. In fact, within a patient data image, only parts around 
the fractured area are of real interest (ROI, Region of Interest) and need to be strictly protected 
(see for example in Fig. 2, we arbitrarily define the content between two lines to be ROI). 
Therefore, we hash our image data in a special way: apply a standard hash function to ROI and 
use an image hashing function [33, 34] to hash the remaining content. Let M be an image, m be 
the ROI and M’ = (M - m) the remaining content, a standard hash function h(.) and an image 
hashing function f(.), then we refer to our hashing method as H+(M) = f(M’, h(m)). 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Image hashing functions are a special class of functions applicable to hash images in such a way 
that the hash values are expected to be invariant under perceptually insignificant changes to an 
image, whereas on perceptually distinct images the hash values need to be different. By applying 
H+(M), we mange to keep data integrity in our system in a flexible way that the sensitive data 
(ROI) are stringently protected while the less sensitive data are allowed for minor changes.  
 
Solution to R3 (S3): An involved party identifies himself using his distinct information such as 
IP address, by which other parties can reach him. Here we refer to Surgery Room as H0, and 
surgeon A as Ha, surgeon B as Hb, and so on. 
For authentication, we can choose between MAC and digital signature and we know using MAC 
is usually more efficient than using digital signature. Basically, there are two kinds of 
authenticating tasks in our system. First, the participants are able to ensure that the images they 
receive are indeed distributed by Surgery Room. We use MAC to this end, namely H+(M, K) with 
secret key K declaring the authenticity of Surgery Room. Second, it is important that a participant 
is able to identify some particular operations are indeed done by the surgeon as it claims. To this 
end, we choose digital signature instead of MAC to authenticate the operations as a particular 
signature can be generated only by the authorised holder. In particular, we choose a public-key 
system that can be used for both purposes of encryption and signature (such as RSA). We utilise 
its functionality of encryption as a secure channel for key distribution in S1. Also it will be used 
in S4. Each participant has a private key (sk) and a public key (pk), and we refer to the signing 
Fig. 2 A Patient Data Image 
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algorithm as Sigsk(.) and the verification algorithm as Verpk(.), encryption algorithm as Epk(.) and 
decryption algorithm as Dsk(.).  
 
Solution to R4 (S4): This is by definition a synchronisation problem. We use the concept of 
“token” as used in Token-Bus LAN [35] and Token-Ring LAN [36] to keep the surgeons 
operating in sequence. Generally, a participating surgeon does not know when it is his turn to 
work in advance, instead, Surgery Room manages this kind of things. We define a secret label, 
referred to as TOKEN, for the synchronisation purpose in our system. TOKEN is chosen by 
Surgery Room and distributed to the first participant. The first participant passes TOKEN to the 
second participant notifying the latter to operate after he has finished his task. Other participants 
work in a similar way. A participant cannot begin his operations without TOKEN. In the 
meantime, a participant always submits his operations together with TOKEN to prove that it is 
really his turn to operate. 
To avoid operation chaos, we design the current TOKEN holder cannot know beyond next 
TOKEN holder in the operation chain. In other words, the first participant knows the second one 
only, and the second participant knows the third one only, and so on. We adapt the scheme 
protecting sequence itineraries of mobile agents [37] to our case. Surgery Room encrypts TOKEN 
in a nested way: 
 
                                                   C3 = Epk(c)(Hb, Hc, H0, TOKEN) 
                                                   C2 = Epk(b)(Ha, Hb, Hc, TOKEN, C3) 
                                                   C1 = Epk(a)(H0, Ha, Hb, TOKEN, C2) 
  
pk(a), pk(b), pk(c) are public keys of Surgeon A, B, C respectively as described in S3. When the 
system begins, Surgery Room sends C1 to Surgeon A. Upon receiving it, A computes Dsk(a)(C1) to 
get (H0, Ha, Hb, TOKEN, C2) and checks C1 indeed comes from H0 and Ha is indeed the intended 
participant (himself). Next, Surgeon A passes C2 to Hb after his operations. Once Surgeon B 
receives C2, he computes (Ha, Hb, Hc, TOKEN, C3) = Dsk(b)(C2) to get TOKEN and do similar 
verifications as Surgeon A does, and afterwards sends C3 to Surgeon C. Similarly, C computes 
(Hb, Hc, H0, TOKEN) = Dsk(c)(C3) and learns he is at the end of the operation chain, thus he returns 
TOKEN to Surgery Room who finally revokes TOKEN and ends current session.              
 
Solution to R5 (S5): To meet access control requirement, all image data need to be segmented by 
pro-processing as mentioned above.  In Fig. 2, a patient data image is roughly segmented into the 
spine and the rest part. Among them, the fracture is again segmented as a special part out of the 
spine.  Consequently, an access control rule for the image is set as Surgeon A is assigned 
privilege to the rest part plus the fracture while Surgeon B and C are restricted their operations 
within the spine. Surgery Room maintains an access control table whose entries are the above 
access control rules, each for a patient data image. When Surgery Room distributes an image to a 
surgeon, the corresponding access control rule related to him is sent too. The concept of access 
control rule facilitates access control check-up required in our system. In fact, a complete access 
control check-up comprises two steps: a preliminary access control check-up is conducted in the 
local site and a further check-up is done by Surgery Room. The latter aims to countermeasure 
against deliberate alterations of the local access control rule by a surgeon. As we will see later, 
only after the two-step check-up, can operations by a surgeon indeed take effect.            
 
We know that managing many cryptographic keys practically is not an easy thing, so in our 
implementation, we intend to equip the participants with as few keys as possible. For example, 
the public-key cryptosystem employed in this system is used to its most, for digital signature as 
well as several encryption purposes.  
 
  
In our system, the role Surgery Room playing is special, thus we differentiate it from participants. 
It originates the system and monitors entire simulated surgery process, i.e., validates every 
operation by the participants. More importantly, we design remote expertise sharing to be a main 
goal of the system, which is realised by managing Surgery Room. Integrating above solutions, 
our system works in a secure way as follows. 
 
1. Pre-processing and initialisation.  
Prior to the system beginning, all patient data images are segmented and access control rule for 
each image is set up. Surgery Room determines a secret key (K) for the symmetric key 
cryptosystem. Every participant chooses his private key (sk) and its corresponding public key (pk) 
for the public-key cryptosystem and makes public his public key. Once every participant logins 
into the system, Surgery Room sends him K through a secure channel defined by his pk, namely 
C = Epk(K). Each participant obtains K = Dsk(C) using his sk.  
2. Surgery Room originates the system by distributing a patient data image to all participants. 
Surgery Room computes C = EK(M, H
+(M, K)) and distributes C to every participant, where M is 
the image. Once receiving it, the participants decrypts DK(C)  = (M, H
+(M, K)) and checks 
integrity of the data image. In addition, distinct access control rule is sent to individual surgeon 
too, in the form of ciphertext by K. In what follows, all communications are assumed to be 
encrypted by K although we do not explicitly point out. H+(M, K) serves dual roles. First, as a 
MAC it undergoes integrity checking. Second, it is intended to prove the authenticity of M to the 
participants. We point out here that H+(M, K) authenticating M has a weakness: a cheating 
surgeon can dispatch images to other surgeons in the name of Surgery Room as every surgeon 
knows K so far. However, as we will see later, this is not a real problem because before 
operations by a surgeon come into effect, they will undergo a ultimate access control check-up by 
Surgery Room and then Surgery Room can easily detect such kind of cheating behaviour.  
3. Each surgeon in turn finishes his operations.  
It is essential that operations by a surgeon (modifications to his local image) simultaneously 
change other remote copies in Surgery Room and all other surgeons too. So subsequent surgeons 
can continue to accomplish their own operations on the basis of previous results and Surgery 
Room can acquire an entire simulated surgery process when every surgeon finishes his step. 
There are two viable ways to achieve this. One straightforward way is that the surgeon sends his 
resulted image to others. The other way is that the surgeon sends his actions taken in the local site 
to others and these actions are re-rendered there. We prefer the latter as the amount of data in 
communication will be significantly reduced. To do this, we formalise actions into a uniform 
form understandable to all involved parties. For example, a tube insertion action in step 1 is 
modelled as <start point, angle, distance>; a balloon inflation action in step 2 is <colour 
changed, {a set of points}> and cavity filling actions in step 3 can be expressed in an analogous 
way. We refer to a semantic <.> as an ACTION. ACTIONs are surrendered in the form of 
transaction [38]. A transaction comprises transaction ID, time marker T and a series of 
ACTIONs, namely (ID, T, {ACTION}). T serves to synchronise operations among surgeons (as 
described later) as well as prevent replay attack. After a transaction is submitted, local site will 
lead a preliminary accesses control check-up according to the local access control rule. Once 
confirmed positively, the transaction will be signed as Sigsk ((ID, T, {ACTION})) by the 
surgeon’s sk and then sent to Surgery Room as well as the transaction queues of all other 
surgeons. Each surgeon gets the transaction out of his transaction queue, verifies it using Verpk(.) 
and waits for the transaction confirmation from Surgery Room. In the meantime, Surgery Room 
does the ultimate access control check-up and then multicasts positive confirmation as (ID, YES) 
or negative confirmation as (ID, NO) to every surgeon. Surgeons will commit their received  
transactions if (ID, YES) is received. A transaction will be rolled back or aborted in case of such 
two events: one is that (ID, NO) is received and the other is that within a prescribed time period, 
  
counting from T, (ID, YES) has not been received. Although this design keeps Surgery Room 
involved in every transaction commitment, it does help to prevent surgeons from unnecessarily 
committing transactions in case of network failures while waiting for the corresponding 
confirmations from Surgery Room.               
Particularly, Surgeon A starts his operations to complete the functionality of step 1 after obtaining 
TOKEN (in the form as introduced in S5) from Surgery Room. Detailed working process is the 
same as described above. After finishing his operations, Surgeon A will signals an ENDING 
OPERATIONS command to others and passes TOKEN to the next participant, Surgeon B. 
Surgery Room and Surgeon B, C change identity of Surgeon A into an obsolete state, which 
means any transaction within the ongoing session from A will be ignored from then on. This is in 
accordance with R4 in the sense that although Surgeon A knows TOKEN, he can no longer 
pretend to be a TOKEN holder again. Surgeon B and C follow the same way to finish their steps.   
4. Surgeon Room starts another session if necessary. 
The working process is same and we will not repeat it. But note that all surgeons’ states will be 
reset and the symmetric key K and TOKEN will be re-chosen by Surgery Room.  
 
 
4 Conclusion 
Modern telemedicine is a tool physicians and health care organizations can use to increase 
productivity and access to care, improve the quality of care delivered, keep costs down and gain a 
competitive advantage [39]. Although various telemedicine systems have been constructed, 
security related issues are rarely considered. In this paper, we pay special attention to secure an 
image-based simulated system for kyphoplasty telesurgery. The main goal of the system is to 
share remote expertise, which is achieved by managing Surgery Room. Two unique requirements 
characterise the system: one is that each virtual surgeon in turn simulates a step of the surgery 
process in line with a real world case. The other is that each surgeon is confined his operations 
within certain particular part of a patient data image, so operations outside his range are presumed 
to be illegal accesses. To meet the first requirement, a TOKEN encrypted in a nested 
encapsulation is employed to synchronise operations among participating surgeons. In addition, if 
a surgeon signals his end of operations, his identity will be changed to an obsolete state in other 
sites. For the second requirement, patient data images are segmented and access control rules for 
them are set up accordingly. We manage to solve other security requirements too. For example, to 
keep data integrity of patient data images during delivery, we combine an image hashing function 
with a standard hash function to preserve strict data integrity of ROI while relax data integrity 
guarantee of the remaining parts.  We base security of our solutions on the existing cryptography 
standards. Efficiency is the primary consideration in implementing the system. To alleviate traffic 
requirement of the system, we intend to send actions by a local surgeon instead of resulted images 
to simultaneously change other remote copies in various sites. This intention is consequently 
realised in the form of transaction as the associated concepts such as “rollback”, “commit” are 
well applicable to our system. Although we confine our discussion to a simulated kyphoplasty 
telesurgery system, methods used in this system can be generalised to other similar systems 
without difficulty. 
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